Why Y2K?

To the Editor:

“Bill O. Reitz” overcomplicates the Y2K situation (“Why Y2K?;” December 1999). I spent over 20 years in the information-processing business from the late ‘60s until the early ‘90s, so I have some knowledge of the genesis and continuation of the so-called Y2K problem. I worked with “magnetic drum” and “core” as well as punched cards, sorting and collating machines, and all the other paraphernalia of the early days. I have no real problem with either of Mr. Reitz’s descriptions of how two digits were used to save space. I can remember programming subroutines in “machine language” to save a few bits (not bytes) of precious room. So I’m just as guilty as anyone, if indeed guilt is the appropriate term.

I start to lose patience when people say that Y2K came as a surprise to the industry and that programmers and analysts are at fault for not correcting the problem before it became critical. When I first went to computer school in the ‘60s it was made clear that the two-digit date was a matter of expediency and would cause problems sooner or later without attention. Anyone in data processing who had a two-digit IQ knew it was a time bomb.

As far back as the late ‘70s and early ‘80s I recall sitting in design and development meetings where the technical people strongly urged that the date fields be expanded because it was becoming apparent that software had a much longer life span than had been thought. In every case it was the managers/bureaucrats/executives at the urging of the “bean counters” who decided that such a change was a budget- and schedule-buster, and they weren’t about to spend the resources. So in fact Y2K came to be in spite of technical protests, and programmers and/or analysts are not to blame.

It’s also my opinion that the job mobility of people in data processing at the time contributed to the problem because the responsible (or irresponsible) managers/bureaucrats/executives could be fairly certain that they would no longer be employed at the same place when the “%&#@ hit the fan” (euphemism for Y2K).

The upshot is that the Y2K problem is the result of bad business decisions, not technical “stupidity and incompetence.”

—Charles Stone
Kissimmee, Florida

Bill O. Reitz replies:

The point of my article was why Y2K came to be in the first place, more than why it was perpetuated. As for overcomplication, as I said, I don’t know if such an analysis (as I included in the article) was done or not; but that if one was done, the programmers (and managers) made what they would have concluded to be the correct decision based on the available information.

I don’t think that Y2K was a surprise to anyone in the know. Even the original programmers no doubt knew of the problem and that someday things would need to be done differently. Mr. Stone implies an interesting point, which I had not considered—that the reason the Y2K “bug” was perpetuated was that software was written incrementally, that is, each new version was derived by modifying the previous version. Given this approach, it is easier to understand why the managers might have acted as Mr. Stone says. This would support Mark Skousen’s idea, which is that people who should have known better took a short-sighted approach for short-term gain. Even then, though, it is possible that the managers simply chose to defer this expense to the future. Unless there is a particular advantage to fixing a problem right away, it might be a reasonable decision to defer the fix. In other words, if the problem had already gotten large enough, there was not necessarily any advantage to fixing it right away.

I don’t think that anyone will ever be able to say with certainty when, or if, things should have been done differently. The point of my article was to get people to think about how the situation came about in the first place. It appears to have done so.

The New Puritans?

To the Editor:

When I read Sheldon Richman’s “Other People’s Business” (December) I couldn’t help but think of H. L. Mencken’s definition of Puritanism as “the haunting fear that someone, somewhere may be happy.” If Galbraith & Co. would mind their own business and live in the world of reality (versus the fantasy world of pure theory), they would be less likely to invent new ways of ordering our lives.

Besides, isn’t Galbraith’s credibility deficient? Does he really expect to be taken seriously after he has been wrong so often? Lest it be forgotten, Galbraith glorified socialism and the Soviet economy for decades. Completely out of touch with reality, he was taken by surprise when that tyranny collapsed.

Of course, many who had “less prestige” and were “less learned” than Galbraith predicted the failure of socialism decades in advance (Mises, Hayek, Friedman, Reagan, and others). Galbraith was still pointing to the integrity and stability of the Soviet economy as a shining example to follow even as East Berliners flocked westward.

As far as I’m concerned, John Kenneth Galbraith and those of similar persuasion have no credibility remaining. I have no doubt that Galbraith’s ideas continue to hold sway over those that refuse to recognize the failure of their long-cherished beliefs. But those of us with less personal investment in such beliefs are under no such compunction to “keep the faith.”

—Michael Koller
Germantown, Maryland