A Reviewer’s Notebook – 1962/4
The deity, in our secular age, receives all too little homage, but we can’t get along without our Lucifers. Not so long ago Lucifer bore the name and visage of Joe McCarthy; today, he assumes a multiple shape in the membership of the John Birch Society. And, projected back into the nineteenth century, he has masqueraded in many other forms, chief of which was the Robber Baron.
The concept of the Robber Baron makes history easy to explain. But was the Robber Baron, aside from a few quite untypical market operators of the stripe of Jay Gould, ever a reality? Reacting from the extreme interpretations which followed in the wake of Gustavus Myer’s History of the Great American Fortunes, a school of historians has arisen to argue that the Robber Baron, though a selfish grabber, had his good side. He may have destroyed his competitors, but he gave the public cheap kerosene. He may have stolen the public domain, but he built railroads across the plains.
In short, as Stewart Holbrook and other recent historians would have it, there is a study that should be known as the social uses of demons. But if the demons were good for society, what, really, is the use of the muckraking historian? In invoking the figure of Lucifer to explain everything, even incidental benefits, isn’t the muckraking historian merely making an empty obeisance to an equally empty convention?
Disdaining the acceptance of any stereotype that would make use of demonology of any sort, Professor Edward C. Kirkland has chosen to build his Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and Public Policy, 1860-1897 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, $10) out of a fresh look at what men actually did and said in the post‑Civil War period. The result, to say the least, is startling. We had known all along that, despite the strictures of Vernon Parrington and the early Charles Beard, the so-called Gilded Age was a time of great vitality. But Professor Kirk-land’s treatment of the era of the "great barbecue" is so absolutely fair-minded that even the most classic of our business scandals seem hardly scandalous at all when he is finished with explaining all the circumstances.
Credit Mobilier
There was, for example, the Credit Mobilier scandal. Virtually every history, even those that have been written by individuals not overly impressed by the Robber Baron thesis, has accepted the Credit Mobilier company as a whipping boy. This construction company, hired to build the Union Pacific railroad, was a false front for the chief stockholders and officials of the Union Pacific itself. Standing on two sides of the bargain, the stockholders and officials chose to reward themselves handsomely out of a public subsidy for building their own railroad.
So, at least, runs the standard tale of Credit Mobilier. But Professor Kirkland insists on viewing the whole operation from the standpoint of a most uncertain time, when railroading represented a great risk. When the participants in the Credit Mobilier took Union Pacific bonds at progressive discounts and received Union Pacific stock as a throw-in, they had no assurance that their venture would ever succeed.
The territory through which the Credit Mobilier proposed to build was a howling wilderness, populated by fierce Indians who followed the buffalo. The price of iron rails was high; wood for cross-ties had to be packed in from eastern forest lands that were far away. There was no way of calculating gains in advance, no assurance that the railroad could originate any ponderable amount of freight in the region that stretched between
As for the stock bonus, it only seems great in retrospect, because the railroad turned out to be a success. Giving the back of his hand to the scandalmongers, Professor Kirkland sums it up by saying that "the financiers took awesome risks, which were lessened by a construction company, limiting the liability of stockholders for debts. No wonder the device built all the transcontinentals… in the end the Credit Mobilier successfully completed a road through unknown territory." This was glory enough, even though the construction company "device" could not be defended at a later date, when a less speculative approach to railroad financing prevailed.
Railroad Rates
In his section on railroad rate-making, Professor Kirkland steers judiciously between the claims and counter-claims of railroad spokesmen and Granger and Populist critics. Though they represented a "natural monopoly," the railroads were, actually, exceedingly competitive with each other until the period of consolidation and "community of interest" got under way in the nineties. To stop what they called cutthroat competition, the railroads tried freight pools, only to discover that "cheating" could not be eradicated. Agreements to share the traffic and the profits could not be enforced by law, even in pre-Sherman Antitrust Act days. So railroad rates were never extortionate, save in isolated patches that were not served by competing lines or by water transport. Professor Kirkland, in another succinct summation, says: "Amid all the buffetings of competition and attempts to flee from it, amid railroad strategy of acquisition and integration, rates went down.
This was the primary fact through all the period." (The italics are ours.)
The Company Town
Professor Kirkland does not plump for a return to the days of the company town. But he notes that in many industrial communities of the nineteenth century, the need for houses provoked "company" villages as "the inevitable prelude to employment." Says Professor Kirkland, there was a vast difference between the "unpainted wooden houses struggling up the barren hillside of a coal town and Pullman, with its buildings of ‘advanced secular Gothic’ along tree-shaded streets, and with the largest houses equipped with bathrooms." The owners of company housing did not ordinarily seek to make a profit on rents—in the town of Pullman, for example, the rents were "about three-fifths what they were" in nearby Chicago, and in New England cities of the Lowell type, "quarters outside company housing cost two or three times the figure set by the corporations."
In the light of such figures, Professor Kirkland feels bound to say that "the charge that company housing exploited workers is largely baseless." The bad feature of the company housing project was that leases could be terminated on short notice. This meant that in the case of a strike or lockout, "loss of job meant loss of home."
The Company Store
Professor Kirkland is much harder on the company stores of the nineteenth century than he is on the company houses. The markup in such stores was often unconscionable, and the goods were sometimes shoddy. The justification for the company store, with its "scrip" money, was that the employer did not always have cash available to give to his workers on pay day. But this does not excuse high mark-ups on the goods that were offered in exchange for scrip. Just why the nineteenth century employer should have been less decent in the matter of providing groceries than he was in the matter of satisfying his workers with living quarters may seem something of a mystery. Professor Kirkland explains it by observing that housing was a "recruiting device," where the company store sought to recapture the wages of men who had already been recruited.
Labor historians have stressed the "class war" aspects of the late nineteenth century. But, despite the periodic eruptions of violence at "bloody
A New Approach To Industrial Economics By James F. Lincoln.
Reviewed by Neil M. Clark
James F. Lincoln, chairman of the fabulous Lincoln Electric Company, has, at 82, written a book outlining his revolutionary industrial philosophy, his two earlier books being devoted to the use of incentive as a management tool. In the book under review, he presents a blueprint for industrial operations which discards factors that limit growth and encourages a break-through to new levels of progress.
Workers and visitors entering the
As captain of his
Improving this in his own company took years. Results, however, proved startling. The company became, and remains, a world leader in its field.
Mr. Lincoln has written a bold book, with vision. He lambastes managers for faulty leadership. But he also shows how they can make "the possible" in
Buy Now—Pay Later BY Hillel Black. William Morrow and Company. 240 pp. $3.95.
Reviewed by Robert M. Thornton
The thesis of this book, in Mr. Black’s own words, is that the American consumer "who buys on credit is often being abused and deceived and in some instances outrageously swindled." As a warning
to the credit buyer and an indictment of the undesirable members of the business community it is a praiseworthy and readable effort, for the author is unsparing in his accounts of sharp business practices that might be legal but are hardly ethical. This book will have a sobering effect on any discriminating reader who is or ever has been heavily in debt; and it may help stir those Mr. Black calls "debt merchants" to straighten up their own house.
The chief criticisms of this book have to do not with what the author says, but with what he fails to say. He repeats that "too many people are being sold more debt than they can afford," but he never says, as he might with equal truthfulness, that too many people are buying more debt than they can afford. It still takes two to make a loan or an installment purchase but Mr. Black focuses critically on the seller. Like other contemporary social critics, he believes that businessmen, by "using the techniques of Madison Avenue," exercise virtually unlimited control over consumer buying habits. Tell this to the merchant with last year’s unsold goods on his shelves! Many self-indulgent people who are overloaded with debts are not innocent victims of "credit crooks," "credit gougers," or "debt merchants," but of their own cupidity.
In his preoccupation with the "sale" of credit, Mr. Black fails even to mention one very important question: Why are so many people willing, yea even eager, to go into debt and live beyond their means? Several answers come to this reviewer’s mind.
First, the heavy taxes most of us pay make it more and more difficult to save money for future purchases.
Second, the high prices brought by inflation and labor union monopolistic practices are a burden on consumers.
Third, although there has been no panic as yet, many persons realize, however dimly, that their money is losing a little of its value every day due to the inflationary policies of the federal government. Hence they are quick to spend what they have before its purchasing power is further diminished.
Fourth, the constant threat of war—the crisis psychology that government provokes—is hardly calculated to encourage people to think and plan ahead and save for the future.
Fifth, government pressure to hold interest rates down makes borrowed money a bargain. When money is "easy," lenders are more lenient in dealing with applicants for loans or credit.
Sixth, the fact that the national government stands ready to bail out all and sundry who are "in need" does little to foster a sense of individual responsibility.
Seventh, the government’s lack of concern about its rising debt and the policy of deficit spending—spend now, pay later—sets a poor example for the citizen. Thus the national government itself is, in a large measure, responsible for the credit boom—the increase in the numbers of those who wish to "buy now and pay later."
Where does Mr. Black turn when he seeks a remedy for the "evils" of credit buying and borrowing? To the national government, alas, which should, he urges, pass a law regulating all credit and borrowing transactions. But legislation is no cure-all; Mr. Black himself notes that many laws governing lending institutions actually help rather than hinder the "loan shark"—the lender who operates outside the law.
We have not yet learned, apparently, that passing a law to protect people from themselves usually creates worse problems than those the law was invoked to solve.









